Why Civil Resistance Works: The
Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict
Erica Chenoweth & Maria J. Stephan
Opening with the dramatic experience of East Timor where,
under the Falintil, a guerrilla-based violent campaign against Indonesia had
been waged for years without success and subsequent nonviolent campaign
successfully won independence for the region, this book endeavours to analyze
232 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns between 1900 and 2006, their
successes or failures and resulting governance structures.
The conclusions? Nonviolent resistance campaigns are
twice as likely to achieve full or partial success as their violent
counterparts. This is true in spite of the degree of repression, its
capabilities or type of governance (democratic or autocratic). The degree of
success varied:
1.
The exception: in anti-succession campaigns, no non-violent campaigns worked but it is not clear how many were tried; of the forty violent
campaigns, only 4 worked.
2.
In anti-regime resistance campaigns, the use of nonviolent
strategies greatly enhanced the probability of success,
3.
In campaigns with territorial objectives (anti-occupation
or self-determination), nonviolent campaigns have a slight advantage,
4.
In resistance campaigns with specific human rights
objectives (anti-apartheid), nonviolent resistance has the monopoly on success.
Violent guerrilla movements may provide the (usually)
youthful male participants with initial personal satisfaction but they usually
fail to attract wide-spread support among the very citizens that they purport
to represent. Older men, women and children[1]
are generally barred from direct participation; many within the age demographic
are not attracted to violence, to the required training or the usually spare
lifestyle. The movement tends to become dependent upon foreign support for weapons,
a support that can be withdrawn at any time. It may also find itself with
unsavoury “partners (the international drug trade). Members tend to be unable
to participate in public discourse, being “underground”. Finally, violent
campaigns are always met with violence and usually the state has greater
resources than the combatants.
Violent resistance does work in 1:4 campaigns. What of
the result? None of those within the study cut-off time period of five years
following their success resulted in democratic regimes. The same lack of trust,
fear of dissent within the ranks, military-like hierarchy and male hegemony
that ensured their success ensures failure to achieve the stated goals of
freedom and citizen participation.
Non-violent campaigns succeed 3:4 times. Non-violent
campaigns require some of the same commitment to “lay one’s life on the line”
as violent campaigns but the barriers to participation are lower on moral,
physical, informational and level of commitment fronts (one can withdraw without penalty at practically any time). Higher numbers of
involvement and diversity means enhanced resiliency, more tactical innovation,
expanded civic disruption (raising costs to the regime of maintaining the
status quo), greater opportunities for loyalty shifts among the opposition[2]
and more international sympathy and support. Non-violent campaigns can make use
of a multitude of civil actions from boycotts to lobbying, sit-ins, walks, and marches,
limited only to the imagination of the participants.
Success depends largely upon the numbers of people
converted to the cause,
the patience and resilience of the participants and the timing of the campaign.
While success does not require a philosophical commitment to non-violence, it
does require strategic commitment and recruitment to that common principle. It
succeeds as a strategy. Provocateurs must be expected; defense requires
pro-active plans for dealing with them[3].
Result after the campaign? The same skills inherent in
waging a nonviolent campaign tend to extend to the governments that form after
it. The immediate result following a successful non-violent campaign is more
likely to be more democratic and participatory than those formed following
violent successful actions.
Given the greater likelihood of success with
non-violent campaigns, why choose violence? My speculations are:
1.
Lack of knowledge and imagination about alternatives –
education levels are lower in those who choose violence.
2.
Pressure from those who benefit from violence – corporate
arms sales, leaders who stand to gain by inter-sectoral distraction from real
issues.
3.
Emotional response overcomes intellectual analysis –
in spite of the greater knowledge and resources of the state, violence becomes
the fallback response[4]
4.
Numbers – non-violent campaigns usually need a lot of
support[5]
and impatience with change often doesn’t wait. Participants have initiated
violence to which they adre now committed.
The kick-shins and knock-heads response to injustice,
rape, and seemingly impenetrable bureaucracies probably exists in all of us (I
certainly count myself as most likely to feel a violent response) but most of
us through education, a sense of responsibility for our actions and vague
expressions of ethics and morals around killing other humans inhibit violence.
Should we then allow ourselves to become overcome with
helplessness and impotence? Let us not be drawn into a false belief that
non-violence means doing nothing.[6]
Studies have shown that “activists” (the people actively trying to make a
difference) of any political stripe are healthier than those who accept the
status quo.
This book has been a challenging read – because it is
a scholarly enterprise. Still I would recommend it to anyone who has the
patience. (I also recommend Gene Sharp’s exhaustive trilogy on non-violence dand
“A Force More Powerful” available in video/CD and book form.) From this book,
there are questions for further research especially analysis of winning
strategies, whether violent or non-violent (what are the hallmarks of a
successful violent campaigns? What are the best set-ups for winning a
non-violent campaign?). Can the conclusions in this book find application on
accomplishing systematic organizational change when dealing with international
or corporate regimes?
More readers would result in more fruitful
discussions…..
[1] An relatively recent exception is the recruitment of individuals to
participate in suicide actions.
[2] A non-violent campaign can be considered to be “winning” when security
personnel “switch sides” and refuse to level violence against protesters.
[3] Dakota
Access Pipeline protests are an excellent recent example of pro-active
attention to the presence of provocateurs.
[4] Many violent campaigns claim to have resorted to violence because
“non-violence didn’t work”. Further analysis suggests that attempts to use
non-violence were very limited (voting, a single march or sit-in, etc.) or
failed to recruit sufficient support to the cause. This latter reason spells
failure of either violence or non-violence.
[5] The Rosenstraße protests are an exception
where a small number of women successfully embarrassed the Nazis into releasing
their Jewish husbands.
[6] Unless “doing nothing” is part of the strategy for change.
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